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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
1997 ("ENDA"),' which was introduced in the
105th Congress on June 10, 1997, is intended to
remedy workplace discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.2 The version of ENDA introduced in the 104th Congress narrowly missed passage in the Senate by one vote. 3 During Senate
floor debate in 1996, a number of Senators raised
arguments in opposition to ENDA that mischaracterized the impact of the legislation on the
4
rights of lesbian and gay public schoolteachers.
These arguments continue to be raised today by
ENDA's opponents.
Most of the concerns raised during Senate floor
debate are rooted in the belief that gay and lesbian people are per se immoral and, therefore, are
bad role models for youth. Certain Senators expressed concern that the presence of a gay or lesbian schoolteacher in the classroom somehow
would harm students. Thus, they argued that
ENDA should not be enacted because it would
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Georgetown University Law Center, Kevin Layton and
Winnie Stachelberg with the Human Rights Campaign, and
Donna Wilson with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,
L.L.P. for their insightful and helpful review of this article.
1 S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1858 105th Cong.
(1997).
2 See 140 CONG. REc. S7581 (daily ed. June 23, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). ENDA was first introduced in
the 103rd Congress. S. 2238, 103rd Cong. (1994), H.R. 4636,
103rd Cong. (1994).

prohibit public school authorities from categorically disqualifying gay people from serving as
schoolteachers or in other positions in which they
have an influence over children.
For example, Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO)
suggested that the presence of a gay schoolteacher would disrupt the development of young
men who may be "unsure about themselves when
they are in transition . . .and [when] they move
from boyhood to manhood." 5 According to Senator Ashcroft, the years from adolescence into
adulthood "are critical times when role 'models
are very important."6 He said: "[I]n hiring
schoolteachers, or camp counselors, or those who
deal with young people, you never just hire a
teacher. You are always hiring more than a
7
teacher. You are hiring a role model."
Referring to ENDA, Senator Ashcroft said, "I do
not think [this] is the right signal to send to the
next generation.""
Sharing Senator Ashcroft's sentiments, Senator
Don Nickles (R-OK) suggested that ENDA would
- John E. Yang, Senate Passes Bill Against Same-Sex Marriage,
WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
4 Although ENDA would cover teachers in public as well
as non-religious, private schools, the Constitutional rights of
public schoolteachers differ significantly from those of private schoolteachers. Because of length considerations, this
article will address the rights of public schoolteachers alone.
The term "schoolteacher" in this article is meant to encompass not only the traditional classroom instructors, but also

coaches, guidance counselors, teacher's aides, and other

school personnel directly responsible for the education and
development of students.
5 142 CONG. REc. S9986, S10,000 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Ashcroft).
6
Id.
7

Id.
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enable gay and lesbian schoolteachers to proselytize in the classroom, and that the bill would prohibit local school boards from controlling in-classroom speech. Equating homosexuality with
promiscuity, he posited:
What about a school board making decisions.., in Alabama where maybe this small community says we do
not think we should have avowed open homosexual
leaders, gay activists, as teachers in the fifth grade? ... I
would urge our colleagues to think about if school
boards... really find promiscuous conduct unacceptable, and such persons engaging in such conduct not
the right type of role models they would like to have for
their young people they would be subject to suit under
ENDA. 9

Yet another Senator took the question of the
regulation of gay schoolteachers' expression further, warning that ENDA would illegitimately prevent school administrators from disciplining gay
and lesbian teachers on the basis of same-sex public displays of affection ("PDAs"):
[S]uppose a single male teacher, during nonschool
hours and in public, holds hands, walks arm in arm
with his girlfriend, and engages in some kissing. I can
well understand if the school authorities do not find
that public behavior a matter for discipline. Under this
bill, however, these same school authorities could not
take action against a male teacher who engages in the
very same public actions Ijtust mentioned, with another
male. I think that forcing [a school board] to treat
both situations the same, in terms of role models for
concerns parents and edschoolchildren and the other 10
ucators might have, is wrong.

In arguing that school boards should have the
power to discriminate against gay men and lesbians as per se bad role models, several Senators referred to the case of Jeffrey Bruton (a.k.a. "Ty
Fox"), a married middle school teacher and
coach in suburban Virginia who resigned and surrendered his teaching license after it was discovered that he led a double life as a gay pornographic video star.'1 Senator Nickles warned that
if ENDA were passed and a school board sought
to discharge a gay teacher on the grounds that he
or she appeared in a pornographic film, "[t]hey
can be sued, under this legislation, not only for
compensatory damages, but [also] for punitive
2
damages."'
This article discusses how these arguments mischaracterize ENDA's scope, overlook well-settled
9 142 CONG. REc. S10,066 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
10 142 CONG. REC S9986, S9993 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
11 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc S9986, S10,000 (daily ed.
Sept., 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); 142 CONG. REC
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constitutional principles delimiting the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of public schoolteachers, and evidence a lack of understanding of
the nature of homosexuality and the current state
of affairs of lesbian and gay teachers in the public
schools. In the first half of this article, I will describe ENDA, then analyze the history of the treatment of schoolteachers as moral exemplars. I will
provide a brief history of the discrimination that
lesbian and gay teachers face, showing how the
Senators' opposition to gay and lesbian teachers
on the basis of vague notions of morality is
neither new nor rare, and will then discuss how
sexual orientation is not a valid factor in determining whether an individual would make a good
role model or schoolteacher. In particular, I will
demonstrate how recent interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal
protection guarantees would prohibit school administrators from categorically excluding gay and
lesbian people from teacher positions, as Senators
Ashcroft and Nickles contemplate.
In the second half of this article, I will examine
the Senators' assumptions concerning the effects
of ENDA on the free speech rights of public
schoolteachers, demonstrating particularly how
ENDA would not affect the ability of school
boards and school administrators to regulate the
in-classroom speech of gay and lesbian teachers,
including school officials' legitimate abilities to
prohibit "proselytizing" and "activism" inside the
classroom. I will also demonstrate how ENDA's
opponents' contention that ENDA would prohibit
school administrators from disciplining gay teachers for same-sex PDAs again begs the question of
whether school administrators have that authority
absent ENDA. The First Amendment's free expression guarantees, and relevant caselaw, suggest
that they do not.
II.

THE EMPLOYMENT NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1997

For the great majority of gay and lesbian Americans, no effective legal recourse exists against emS10129, S10132 (daily ed. Sept, 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); 142 CONG. RFc S10,129, S10,135 (daily ed. Sept, 10,
1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles). See also Loudon Teacher
Quits Over Porn Video Role, WAsH. TiMES,July 27, 1996, at All.
142 CONG. REC S10129, S10134 (daily ed. Sept. 10,
12
1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
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ployment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Current federal anti-discrimination law
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, national origin, sex (gender),
age, and disability, 13 but not sexual orientation.
Attempts to assert that sexual orientation discrimination constitutes sex discrimination proscribed
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 the
primary federal law prohibiting employment discrimination, have failed.' 5 Moreover, although
eleven states and the District of Columbia, as well
as more than 100 local jurisdictions, have enacted
13 Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Section 4(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a) (1994), prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age. Section 102 of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (1994), prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of disability. Additional statutes prohibit discrimination
by entities receiving federal funding. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1995), prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and religion. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(1995), prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by
such entities. Section 303 of the Age Discrimination Act of
1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1995), prohibits discrimination on
the basis of age by such entities. Section 901 of Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1995), prohibits discrimination based on sex in educational
institutions that receive such funds.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin).
15 See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
para. 41,332, at 70,107 (6th Cir. 1992) (ruling against postal
worker who brought sexual orientation discrimination claim
under Title VII. The court concluded that the postal
worker's coworkers' actions were all directed at demeaning
him solely because they disapproved vehemently of his alleged homosexuality. "These actions, although cruel, are not
made illegal by Title VII."); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals."); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30
(9th Cir. 1979) ("[W]e conclude that Title VII's prohibition
of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on the
basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality.") (footnote
omitted) (following Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566
F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977)).
16 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1997); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81 (c) (West 1995); D.C. CODE §§ 12501 to 1-2557 (Michie 1991 and Supp. 1997); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (Michie Supp. 1996); MAsS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03
(West Supp. 1997); 1997 N.H. LAWS 108 (effective Jan. 1,

ANN.

1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS

§§ 11-24-2-11-24-2.2, 28-5-3, 28-5-5, 28-5-7 (1995 & Supp.
1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.36 (West 1997). All ten jurisdictions prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment

legislation proscribing sexual orientation discrimination in employment, 16 the rest of America offers no such protection.
Although the types of discrimination afflicting
gay and lesbian Americans have evolved with
changes in economic and social dynamics, 1 7 it remains true that today the gay and lesbian community is among the most discriminated against minority groups in the nation. Not only do gay
people suffer from rampant employment discrimination,18 they also face more life-threatening

and all but California extend this protection to housing.
Minnesota and Wisconsin also outlaw sexual orientation discrimination in public and private education. In Maine, the
effectiveness of a non-discrimination statute prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment, housing, and
public accommodations that was enacted in May 1997 was
put on hold pending a successful February 10, 1998 referendum which repealed the law. See 1997 ME. LAwS 205; see also
Maine's Gay-Rights Law Loses Court Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
23, 1997, at B5; Ballot Sites Added in Gay-Rights Vote, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 4, 1998, at B3; Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal Law Banning Gay Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al,
A33. For information on local jurisdictions that afford protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation,
see Human Rights Campaign, State, Cities and Counties Which
ProhibitDiscrimination Based on Sexual Orientation (visited Jan.
27, 1998) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/nd/
ndjuris.html>; Note, ConstitutionalLimits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L.R. 1905, 1923-25 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing
Conditionsfor Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship,
1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L.R. 817, 925-28, 970 (1997) (providing numerous examples of anti-discrimination protections afforded by local jurisdictions.
17

SeeJoFtN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B.

FREEDMAN, INTIMATE

A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA, 226-27, 288
(1988); Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights:
A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REv. 1551, 1564-67 (1993); see also
Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, HARV.
L. REv. 1508 (1989) (discussing the history of discrimination
MATTERS:

against gay and lesbian Americans in public and private employment).
18 Twenty surveys conducted across the nation between

1980 and 1991 demonstrated that between 16 and 44% of gay
men and lesbians had experienced workplace discrimination.
See Employment Discriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientation:
Hearings on S. 2238 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1994) (statement
of Anthony P. Carnevale, Chair, National Commission for
Employment Policy); see also The Employment Non-Discrimination Act: Hearing on H.R. 1863 Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Programs of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Cong. 181-228
(1996) (statement of Chai R. Feldblum, Associate Professor
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Appendix I
(Summary of Reported Sexual Orientation Cases Before Federal and State Courts), Appendix II (Tabulation of Complaints Filed in Six States with Sexual Orientation Laws as of
1994) and Appendix III (Documented Cases ofJob Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, Human Rights Campaign, Monograph, 1995)).
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forms of bias, such as violent hate crimes.1 "
Patterned after Title VII, ENDA provides that a
"covered entity" cannot, with respect to employment or an employment opportunity, subject an
individual to different standards or treatment, or
otherwise discriminate against the individual, on
the basis of the individual's real or perceived sexual orientation or that of a person with whom the
20
individual is believed to associate.
The term "covered entity" includes most federal
and state employers2 ' as well as private employers.
Private employers that are covered are those entities "engaged in an industry affecting commerce,"
as defined in Section 701 (h) of the Civil Rights
2
Act of 1964,22 that have 15 or more employees. 3
ENDA does not apply to the armed forces 24 nor to
religious organizations, except regarding employment in a position whose duties are dedicated
solely to generating unrelated business income
subject to Federal taxation. 25 Moreover, ENDA
would not apply to the provision of employee
spousal benefits, 26 explicitly prohibits quotas or
any preferential treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation, 27 prohibits the Equal Employment
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on sexual orientation from covered entities, and
affirmatively disallows disparate impact claims
8
based on a prima facie violation of the statute.2
ENDA has earned widescale support. As of August 28, 1997, ENDA had thirty-five Senate cosponsors and 148 House co-sponsors. 29 President
Clinton has endorsed ENDA and has committed
to sign it into law if passed by Congress.30 Dozens
of major corporations including Apple Computer,
AT&T, Bell Atlantic, Bethlehem Steel, Eastman
Kodak, Honeywell, Merrill Lynch, Microsoft,
Quaker Oats, RJR Nabisco, and Xerox have endorsed the bill for passage. 3 1 A large number of
church groups and non-profit organizations also
have endorsed ENDA. 32 Major civil rights figures,
such as Coretta Scott King, have endorsed
ENDA,-"13 as has former conservative Republican
Senator Barry Goldwater, who reasoned that
"[e]mployment discrimination based on sexual
orientation is a real problem in our society. From
coast to coast and throughout the heartland, regular hardworking Americans are being denied the
right to roll up their sleeves and earn a living.
34
That is just plain wrong."

Opportunity Commission from collecting statistics

19

See HATE

CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LES-

7 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill
eds., 1992) (noting that gay people appear to be one of the
most frequent victims of hate crimes); see also U.S. DEP'T OF
BIANS AND GAY MEN

JUST., FED'L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS 1996 7 tbl.1 Uan. 8, 1998) (stating that the FBI received
reports of 1,016 crimes in 1996 targeting people because of
their sexual orientation, representing 11.5 percent of the to-

tal 8,759 bias-motivated incidents reported to the FBI for that
period. Following a 1993 study on hate crimes, the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations reported that
in 1993 gay men had replaced African Americans as the leading target of hate crimes, having been targeted in 27 percent
of the 783 hate crimes documented by law enforcement
agencies and community organizations.

Errol A. Cockfield,

Jr., Crimes of Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at B1.
20 See ENDA, S. 869 § 4, H.R. 1858 § 4.
21
See id. § 3 (including government employers encompassed by section 717(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), section 302(a)(1) of the Government
Employee Rights Act of 1991, 2 U.S.C. § 1202(1), or the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1301
(West 1997).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(h) (1994).
23 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, S.
869 § 3(3).
24
25
26
27

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

§
§
§
§

10(a)(1).
9.
6.
8.

See id. § 7.
See Human Rights Campaign, 105th Congress Current
Cosponsors of the Employment Non-DiscriminationAct (visited Jan.
27, 1998) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/leg/enda/endacs.html>.
30 See Clinton Backs Bill to Bar Job Bias Against Gays, Ci.
TRIB., Oct. 21, 1995, at 8N.
"I See Human Rights Campaign, CorporationsEndorsingthe
Employment Non-discrimination Act (ENDA) (visited Jan. 27,
1998) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/enda/endacorp.html>.
32 The American Jewish Committee, the Episcopal
Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Presbyterian
Church (USA), the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and the United Methodist Church, among others, have
endorsed ENDA. See Human Rights Campaign, Churches and
Religious Organizations Endorsing the Employment Non-Discrimi28

29

nation Act (ENDA)

(visited Jan. 27, 1998) <http://

www.hrc.org/issues/leg/enda/endarel.html>. The American Bar Association, the American Nurses Association, the
American Psychological Association, the AFL-CIO, the National Women's Law Center, and People For the American
Way, among others, have endorsed ENDA. See Human
Rights Campaign, OrganizationsEndorsingthe Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA) (visited Jan. 27, 1998) <http://
www.hrc.org/issues/leg/enda/endaorg.html>.
-13 See 142 CONG. REC S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
34

Id.
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III.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS NOT
DETERMINATIVE OF WHETHER A
TEACHER IS A GOOD ROLE MODEL OR
A GOOD EDUCATOR

Those Senators who opposed ENDA were correct in asserting that public schoolteachers are selected for characteristics that render them good
educators as well as good role models for students. They are incorrect, however, in suggesting
that gay and lesbian people are a bad influence
on youth and thus should be excluded categorically from teaching positions. Such a suggestion
belies the nature of homosexuality and the successful, longstanding presence of lesbian and gay
teachers in the nation's schools.

"A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. .

sion.

A.

Schoolteachers as Moral Exemplars

As a consequence of their responsibility for the
intellectual and moral development of children,
schoolteachers are held to a high code of personal and professional conduct. 35 Courts have ac-

corded parents the right to expect that those who
are entrusted with the education of their children
possess innate virtue and morality, as defined by
the attitudes and sensibilities of the community.3 6
In 1790, Noah Webster contended that "the only
practicable method to reform mankind, is to begin with children; to banish, if possible, from their
company, every low bred, drunken, immoral character .... The great art of correcting mankind

therefore, consists in prepossessing the mind with
good principles.

'' 37

In its 1952 Adler v. Board of Education38 decision,
the Supreme Court echoed Webster's sentiments:
35 See Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal.
1973) (en banc); Board of Trustees v. Hartman, 55 Cal. Rep.
144, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Governing Bd. of Mountain
View Sch. Dist. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. Rep. 724, 727 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974).
36
See, e.g., Tingley v. Vaughn, 17 Ill. App. 347, 350-51
(1885); Schwer's Appeal, 36 Pa. D. & C. 531, 533 (1939)
(finding that a teacher who failed to "command the respect
nor good will of the community" could be deemed incompetent); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (invalidating statute requiring public university
professors to sign national loyalty pledge).
37 NOAH WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIVE
WRITINGS (1790) quoted in KAREN M. HARBECK, GAY AND LESBIAN EDUCATORS:

PERSONAL FREEDOMS, PUBLIC CONSTRAINTS,

113-14 (1997).
38
342 U.S. 485 affd per curiam sub nom., L'Hommedieu v.
Board of Regents, 342 U.S. 951 (1952), and overruled in part
by Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

.

.That the school authorities have the

right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers,
and employees as to their fitness to maintain the
integrity of the school as part of ordered society,
39
cannot be doubted."
Because standards for the selection and governance of teachers traditionally are set by local
elected officials, these standards more often than
not reflect the social mores of the local community. It is not surprising, therefore, that at times
the conduct proscribed by local school administrators has included public smoking, drinking,
dancing, theater going, loitering, and even automobile rides on weekday nights and leaving town
without the school board chairman's permis40

Having local politicians prescribe standards for
the selection and promotion of teachers has ratified unjust social biases, under the guise of vague
iterations of morality, as criteria for identifying
good teachers. For example, individuals perceived to be Communists, 4 1 spouses in mixed-race
marriages, 42 and pregnant women 43 at one time
were excluded from schoolteacher positions because the local community considered them immoral or a bad influence on children. The practice of applying majoritarian community
prejudices in schoolteacher employment decisions is by no means a uniquely American phenomenon. In the mid-1930s, Jewish public teachers in Germany were fired from theirjobs because
Jews were perceived as per se immoral and poor
44
role models for children.
Because gays and lesbians throughout history

39
40

(1971).
41

Id. at 493.
See DAVID

RUBIN,

THE RIGHTS OF TEACHERS

108-09

See HARBECK, supra note 37, at 179-86; see also Beilan v.

Board of Pub. Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (holding that

public schoolteacher's discharge did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause where teacher refused to answer school superintendent's question concerning
teacher's Communist party affiliation and such refusal constitted "incompetency" within Pennsylvania public school
code provision that made incompetency a ground for discharge).
42
See, e.g.,
Clark v. Louisa County Sch. Bd., 472 F. Supp.

321 (E.D. Va. 1979).
43 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974).
44 ERWIN J. HAEBERLE, Swastika, Pink Triangle and Yellow
Star: The Destruction of Sexology and the Persecution of Homosexuals in Nazi Germany, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING
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have been discriminated against on the basis of
the majoritarian view that homosexuality is per se
immoral, 4 5 it is not surprising that lesbian and gay

teachers have been discriminated against in
schoolteacher positions. As described in the following section, the emergence of organized gay
communities and a gay "identity" over the past
half century has mobilized anti-gay forces that
have rallied against equal rights for lesbians and
gay men. Most often, these political attacks-similar to those used in the 1996 ENDA floor debates-have relied upon distorted images of lesbians and gays in the politically charged public
school setting as a means to quickly incite public
opposition to ENDA-like equal rights legislation.
B.

A Brief History of the Treatment of Gay and
Lesbian Teachers As Per Se Immoral

1.

The Emergence and Vilification of a Gay Identity

In the United States, government-sanctioned
and overt discrimination against gay men and lesbians became most prevalent following the emergence of gay and lesbian communities and a distinct "gay identity. " 4 6 Whereas society had long
since treated homosexuality as a vilified behavior, the
emergence of a gay identity acquainted the world
with homosexuals-individuals who comprised a
culture that evidenced characteristics and motiva7
tions unrelated to particular sexual practices.4
The birth of gay and lesbian communities also
gave rise to opportunities for the government (inTHE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST

370 (Martin B. Duberman et al.

eds., 1990).
45 See John D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities:
The Tensions Between Gay Politics and History, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 915, 917 (1986); Anne B. Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087
(1988); see generallyJOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITv, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EuROPE FROM THE

BEGINNING

OF THE

CHRISTIAN

ERA

TO THE

FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980).

46 See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality,
and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PIrr. L. REv. 237, 272
(1996) (citing D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 22627.)

See also JOIIN D'EMILIO, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in

46, 47 (William B. Rubenstein, ed., 2d ed. 1997) (tracing the emergence of a gay identity). D'Emilio disagrees with the notion that gay people
have existed forever. He posits that gay men and lesbians:
are a product of history .... [l]t has been the historical
development of capitalism-more specifically, its free labor system-that has allowed large numbers of men and
women in the late twentieth century to call themselves
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW

cluding law enforcement officers) to single-out
and harass gay people, thereby setting the norm
for the treatment of homosexuals by private em4
ployers, landlords, and other private actors .
This governmental repression of the emerging
gay and lesbian identity originated at the highest
levels. For example, in 1950, the Senate Investigations Subcommittee was instructed "to make an
investigation into the employment by the Government of homosexuals and other sex perverts," and
concluded that homosexuals were unqualified for
government employment because they "lack emo'49
tional stability of normal persons."

Such blatant acts of bigotry against gay people
provoked lesbians and gay men to become politically organized in order to wrest equal rights from
their local and state governments.5 0 At times, nascent gay political organizations were successful in
5
advocating passage of gay civil rights ordinances. '
Such hard-won civil rights protections, however,
came at a price.

2.

The Anti-Gay Backlash

The passage of early gay and lesbian civil rights
ordinances engendered a backlash from conservative activists who rallied support for the repeal of
these laws by advancing arguments concerning
gay and lesbian teachers similar to those articulated by those Senators who vocally opposed
ENDA. In the late 1970s, then-popular entertainer Anita Bryant sought to rid Miami schools of
gay, to see themselves as part of a community of similar
men and women, and to organize politically on the basis
of that identity.

Id.
47
NITIES:

SeeJOHN
THE

D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL

MAKING

OF

A HOMOSEXUAL

COMMU-

MINORITY IN

THE

1940-1970 9-39 (1983) (positing that the urbanization of the United States led to the creation of lesbian
and gay enclaves in major cities that in turn facilitated the
development of lesbian and gay minority communities and
identities).
48
Patricia Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A
Legal History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551, 1565 (1993).
49 Id. at 1565-66 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS
UNITED STATES,

OF THE COMM.

ON EXPENDITURE IN THE EXECUTIVE

DEP'TS.,

EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN

GOVERNMENT, INTERIM REPORT,

S.

Doc.

No. 241, 81st Cong.,

2d Sess. 4 (1950)).
50 See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the
Law, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1508, 1515-16 (1989).
51
See State and Local Laws, in RUBENSTEIN, supra note 46,
at 468-73.
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"deviant" influences by laboring successfully to repeal a Dade County, Florida ordinance supporting gay and lesbian housing and employment protections. 52 Contending that "I'd rather my child
be dead than be a homosexual," 53 Bryant crusaded against the ordinance with zeal, advocating
that "Homosexuality is a sin, and if homosexuals
were given carte blanche to glamorize their 'deviant lifestyle' in Miami-area classrooms, the American family would be destroyed and the American
54
way of life would disappear."

Bryant contended that in Los Angeles alone,
30,000 students under the age of 12 were being
"recruited and sexually abused by homosexuals." 55 Bryant invoked the "role model" argument

much in the same way that the argument was used
during the 1996 ENDA Senate floor debate: "Unless repealed, the ordinance will allow homosexuals.., to provide 'role models' for the impressionable . .

.

. This recruitment of our children is

absolutely necessary for the survival and growth of
homosexuality-for since homosexuals cannot
reproduce, they must recruit, must freshen their
ranks. "56
In the end, Bryant's efforts, although perceived
as irrational by many, prevailed. On June 7, 1977,
Dade County voters repealed the housing and employment anti-discrimination ordinance by a vote
See Bill Peterson, Gay Rights Law Loses 2-1 in Miami,
POST, June 8, 1977, at Al.
Civil rights activists still
have not been able to have this ordinance re-enacted.
53
Millie Ball, I'd Rather My Child Be Dead Than Homo, THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 19, 1977, at 3.
54
Ken Kelley, "Cruising with Anita," Playboy (May 1978),
at 75.
55
Harbeck, supra note 37, at 49 (quoting Kay Zahasky,
Anita Bryant: Exclusive Interview, TODAY'S STUDENT, Feb. 6,
1978). Bryant warned that the "'national goals' of the 'homosexual conspiracy' were to overturn age of consent laws
and acquire 'special legal privileges'" in order to recruit
schoolchildren. Id. (quoting Zahasky, supra).
56
ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY 146 (1977)
reprinted in RUBENSTEIN, supra note 46, at 475, 476.
57
See Peterson, supra note 52, at Al. That same year,
Good Housekeeping magazine named Anita Bryant the "most
popular woman in America," based on a national readers
poll. Harbeck, supra note 37, at 53 (quoting Zahasky, supra
note 55).
58
Kristina Campbell & Lyn Stoesen, 19 Years of Ballot Battles, WASti. BLADE, Nov. 12, 1993, at 14; see also Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REv.
1905, 1908 (1993). Anita Bryant reprised her earlier success
in Florida by persuading Oklahoma legislators to have the
Briggs Initiative language enacted on April 6, 1978. The
Oklahoma statutory provision, however, was later overturned
by the 10th Circuit as overbroad because it punished protected, out-of-classroom speech. See National Gay Task Force
52

WASH.

of 69 percent to 31 percent with over 30,000 citi57
zens casting their votes.
Bryant's formula was replicated in other states,
such as Minnesota, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Oregon. 58 In California, a ballot referendum known

as the Briggs Initiative or "Proposition 6," introduced in June 1977 by State Senator John Briggs
(R-Fullerton) sought to "rid schools of homosexual teachers"'5 9 ,by permitting the firing of any
public school employee who engaged in "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting [ ]private or public homosexual activity." 60
The Briggs Initiative was defeated in California on
November 7, 1978.61

In Oklahoma, Anita Bryant reprised her earlier
success in Florida by persuading Oklahoma legislators to have the Briggs Initiative language enacted (as what was referred to as "Helm's Bill" after its sponsor, Oklahoma State Senator Mary
Helm) on April 6, 1978. The Oklahoma statutory
provision, however, was later overturned by the
10th Circuit Court of Appeals as overbroad because it punished protected, out-of-classroom
speech. 62 Similar attempts to pass initiatives to repeal employment non-discrimination statutes protecting gay and lesbian employees persist to this
day.

63

v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984), afj'd
470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per curiam).
59 See The Pride Legal Defense Fund, Proposition Six,
(1978), cited in HARBECK, supra note 37, at 63.
60
Nan D. Hunter, Speech, Identity and Equality, 79 VA. L.
REv. 1695, 1703 (1993) (citing California Proposition 6,
§ 3(b)(2) (1978)). The Briggs Initiative would have
amended the California State Education Code with language
including the following:
As a result of continued close and prolonged contact
with schoolchildren, a teacher, teacher's aide, school administrator or counselor becomes a role model whose
words, behavior and actions are likely to be emulated by
students coming under his or her care ....

For these

reasons the state finds a compelling interest in refusing
to employ and in terminating the employment of a
schoolteacher, a teacher's aide, a school administrator
or a counselor, subject to reasonable restrictions and
qualifications, who engages in public homosexual activity and/or public homosexual conduct....
California Proposition 6, § 1 (1978), reprinted in HARBECK,
supra note 37, at app. B.
61
See Andrea Pearldaughter, Employment Discrimination
Against Lesbians: Municipal Ordinances and Other Remedies, 8
WOMEN'S L.F. 538, 553 (1979), cited in HARBECK, supra note
37, at 81.
62
See National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1274.
63
In 1992, citizens of Colorado passed a referendum
that resulted in "Amendment 2" to the Colorado Constitu-
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3.

Gaylord v. Tacoma School District No. 10

The impact of anti-gay activism in the 1970's
did not spare the courts. Like some legislatures, a
number of courts succumbed to majoritarian
prejudices by finding that gay and lesbian people
are per se immoral and thus unqualified to hold
teachingjobs. In 1977, at the height of Anita Bryant's crusade against gay and lesbian equal rights,
the Supreme Court of Washington, in Gaylord v.
Tacoma School District No. 10,64 upheld the dismissal of James Gaylord, a well-respected and experienced public high school teacher, solely on the
grounds that he admitted he was gay. 6 5 The
school board's written policies required holders
of teaching certificates to be persons "of good
moral character," and provided that "immorality"
is sufficient grounds for discharge. 66 A student

who had sought Gaylord's advice on an academic
matter told the school principal that, from his discussion, he believed that Gaylord was gay. When
the principal conferred with Gaylord, Gaylord
confirmed his homosexuality. Less than
one
month later, Gaylord was notified that the Tacoma School Board had probable cause for his
discharge due to his homosexuality, and a short
67
time after that, he was discharged.
In equating homosexuality with immorality, the
court resorted to quoting the New CatholicEncyclopedia, noting that it characterizes homosexuality
as immoral. 68 The court also found dispositive
that "[h] omosexuality is widely condemned as immoral and was so condemned as immoral during
biblical times." 6 1 Having concluded that homosexuality is inherently immoral, the court held,
tion, which prohibited government entities from enforcing
or enacting any action that would protect individuals from

discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 30(b). In 1993, Porstmouth, New Hampshire voters barred "protected" legal status for gay men and
lesbians, and voters in Cincinnati, Ohio endorsed an initiative to rescind and ban statutory protections for gay and lesbian citizens, patterned after the Colorado Amendment 2
language. See generally Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati,
54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded for further
consideration in light of Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996)
(mem.); The 1993 Elections: Propositions, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3,
1993, at A24. All of these statutes were invalidated by the
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without any actual evidence, that Gaylord's remaining on the school's faculty would have been
70

unacceptably disruptive.

C.

Gays and Lesbians Are Just As Likely As
Heterosexuals To Serve As Excellent
Teachers and Role Models

1. Dispelling the "Recruitment" and "Molestation"
Myths
Implicit in the views of the Gaylord court and
the anti-gay activists who backed the Briggs and
Dade County initiatives was the misconception
that the very presence of these gay men and lesbians as authority figures in the lives of students
might in some way have the effect of "recruiting"
these young people "into" homosexuality. Also
implicit in these views is the belief that gay and
lesbian people have a tendency to be pedophiles
and thus must be kept away from children. The
Senators' statements in opposition to ENDA cited
above quite clearly echo these longstanding sentiments.
a.

The Nature of Sexual Orientation

The notion that gay people recruit and proselytize, or even worse, molest youth more often than
heterosexuals is squarely disproved by hard statistics and by the evolving social and scientific understanding concerning the nature of homosexuality. Gay people are no more likely-and actually
may be less likely-to molest children than are
heterosexuals. 7' Moreover, children exposed to
64

559 P.2d 1340 (Wash. 1977) (en banc). See also Row-

land v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 451 (6th Cir.
1984) (upholding dismissal of public school counselor for
mentioning her lesbianism to colleague at school).
65
Gaylord, 559 P.2d at 1347.
66
67

See id. at 1342.
See id.

68

See id. at 1343.

69

Id. at 1345.

70

See id. at 1347.

71

See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation:A

Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133,

Supreme Court's Romer v. Evans decision. 116 S. Ct. 1620

152-56 (1991); CaroleJenny, et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 41 (1994) (find-

(1996). In Romer, the Supreme Court held that Amendment

ing that records in a child sexual abuse clinic revealed that

2 to the Colorado constitution failed to further a proper leg-

children were far more likely to be abused by the heterosex-

islative end and violated the Equal Protection clause insofar
as it prohibited an entire class of citizens, i.e., gays and lesbians, from seeking the aid of their government to redress
wrongs. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.

ual partner of a close relative than by a gay or lesbian person); Judd Marmor, ClinicalAspects of Male Homosexuality, in
HOMOSEXUAL BEIIAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL, 271 (Judd
Marmor ed. 1980).
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gay and lesbian role models are no more predisposed to "becoming" homosexuals than children
exposed to few or no gay and lesbian influences.
One researcher, in fact, discovered that of thirtyseven children raised by same-sex parents, thirty72
six of the children grew up to be heterosexual.
If sexual orientation could "rub off' as easily as
some of ENDA's Senate opponents suggest it
does, then presumably all children of heterosexuals would grow up to be heterosexuals. Ronald
Reagan made an eloquent attempt to dispel this
myth in a public statement opposing California's
Briggs Initiative in 1978:
As to the role model argument, a woman writing to the
editor of a Southern California newspaper said it-all: 'If

teachers had such power over children, I would have
been a nun years ago.' Whatever else it is, homosexuality is not a contagious disease like the measles. Prevail-

ing scientific opinion is that an individual's sexuality is
determined at a very early age and
that a child's teach73
ers do not really influence this.

Although the scientific community has not
reached agreement on whether homosexuality is
a genetic trait, it has reached a broadbased consensus on the proposition that a person's sexual
orientation, whether heterosexual or homosexual, is fixed and generally is not subject to conscious change.7 4 No doubt, this growing understanding of the nature of homosexuality was
precipitated by gay and lesbian people asserting
See Richard Green, M.D., Sexual Identity of 37 Children
Raised By Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135:6 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692-697 (June 1978); see also Jeanne J. Speizer, Role
Models, Mentors, and Sponsors: The Elusive Concepts. 6 (4) SIGNS:
J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SoC'Y 692 (1981); see generally Richard Green, M.D., THE "Sissy BoY SYNDROME" AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1987).
72

73

RONNIE DUGGER, ON REAGAN, THE MAN AND HIS PRESI-

264, 559 n.3 (1983).
See Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, March 1993, at 47 (summarizing scientific developments identifying possible genetic basis for homosexual
orientation); Gary Ramafedi, Homosexual Youth: A Challenge to
Contemporary Society, 258JAMA 222-23 (1987) (reporting that
DENCY
74

most studies find sexual orientation well-established by early

childhood); see also Eli Coleman, ChangingApproaches to the
Treatment of Homosexuality in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES, 81-88 (William Paul, et
al. eds. 1982); ALAN P. BELL, SEXUAL PREFERENCE-ITs DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN, 166-67, 211, 222 (1981); N. McConaghy, Is a Homosexual Orientation Irreversible?, 129 BRT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 556, 563 (1976); Frank X. Acosta, Etiology and
Treatment of Homosexuality: A Review, 4 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL
BEHAV.

9, 23-24 (1975); see generally C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMO(1975); Michael W. Ross & Olli W. St.lstr6m,

SEXUAL MATRIX

Exorcism as Psychiatric Treatment: A Homosexual Case Study, 8
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV.
75

379, 379 (1979).

In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association re-

their identities. Now viewing homosexuality as an
innate characteristic, the mainstream scientific
community has revoked its traditional formula75
tion of homosexuality as disease.

Facing the mounting scientific and social pressures, churches have begun to moderate their
views on homosexuality. Perhaps the most striking example of this trend is the Roman Catholic
Church, which despite a history of deeming
homosexuals as per se immoral, has begun to manifest a more conciliatory approach to the notion
that gay and lesbian people are entitled to full
religious, political, social, and familial enfranchisement. In a remarkable pastoral message
from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops U.S. Catholic Conference, the American Roman Catholic Church leadership urged parents to
love and not reject their gay and lesbian children,
calling sexual orientation "a fundamental dimension of one's personality. ''7 6 In perhaps its most
groundbreaking statement, the U.S. Bishops clarified that homosexual orientation alone cannot be
considered immoral: "[h]omosexual orientation
is experienced as a given, not as something freely
chosen. By itself, therefore, a homosexual orientation cannot be considered sinful, for morality
77
presumes the freedom to choose."

Although weakened by its internal contradic-

moved homosexuality from the category of sociopathic personality disturbances in the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS (DSM-II).
See RONALD
BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF DIAGNOSIS 129, 137 (1981). In 1985, the American
Psychological Association resolved that homosexual orientation "implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability
or general social or vocational capabilities." American Psychological Association, Resolution (Jan. 1985), excerpted in
Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd
on other grounds 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992).
76
Always Our Children: Pastoral Message to Parents of
Homosexual Children and Suggestions for Pastoral Ministers, National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on
Marriage and Family, Sept. 10, 1997 [hereinafter Pastoral

Message] reprinted in 27

ORIGINS, CNS DOCUMENTARY

SERVICE

285 (Oct. 9, 1997). See also Caryl Murphy, U.S. Catholic Bishops Urge Acceptance of Gay Orientation, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1997, at Al, A18.
77 PastoralMessage, supra note 76, at 289 Although a welcome and encouraging sign of the Catholic Church's increased understanding of the plight of gay and lesbian
Catholics, the Bishops' Letter advances a constricted existence for gay and lesbian Catholics who wish to live within the
Church's mandates. While the Bishops clarify that a homosexual orientation alone cannot be considered sinful and immoral, they continue to assert that homosexual contact is immoral. See id. at 290. Thus, the only way for a gay or lesbian
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tion, 78 the Church's position undercuts the view
that gay and lesbian people are per se immoral
and, thus, a bad influence on children. In light of
the new scientific and religious understandings
concerning the origins and nature of homosexuality, the attitudes and beliefs advanced by
ENDA's opponents in the Senate concerning
ENDA and teachers appear even more outdated
and anachronistic.
2.

Role Models for Gay and Lesbian Youth

Not only are the Senators' comments based on
outdated perspectives on the nature of homosexuality, they also incorrectly presuppose that there

are no gay or lesbian schoolchildren.

Studies

have shown that sexual orientation is set in very
early childhood, perhaps even before birth. 79 Gay
and lesbian youth often face extreme difficulties
growing up. Unlike children in religious, racial,
or ethnic minority communities who are nurtured
and prepared by their families to face society's
prejudices and injustices, gay youth typically grow
up isolated in school, family, and community environments that, more often than not, ostracize and
condemn gay people. The absence of positive gay
and lesbian role models further isolates these gay
youths and aggravates their already tormented existences.
Catholic to comply with the Church's moral code would be
to lead a chaste existence.
78 Although the Bishops acknowledge that gay and lesbian people do not choose to be homosexual and thus cannot be adjudged as per se immoral, they persist in deeming

homosexual sexuality (i.e., sexual activity by gay or lesbian
Catholics) as immoral and advocate a "chaste life" for gay
and lesbian Catholics. See id. at 290. In making this strained
status/conduct distinction, the Bishops fail to explain why
homosexual sexual orientation is not immoral in terms of status and identity, but somehow becomes immoral when acted
upon.
See, e.g., Gary Remafedi, Homosexual Youth: A Challenge
to Contemporary Society, 258 JAMA 222, 223 (1987) (claiming
79

that most studies conclude that sexual orientation is well-established by early childhood).
80
Quoted in Katherine A. O'Hanlan, et al., Homophobia is
a Health Hazard, USA TODAY MAG., Nov. 1996, at 26, 26-27.

See also A. Damien Martin & Emery S. Hetrick, The Stigmatization of the Gay and Lesbian Adolescent, 15 J. HOMOSEXUALITY
163, 167 (1988) ("There is little or no opportunity for the
homosexually oriented adolescent to discover what it means
to be homosexual. Therefore, they cannot plan or sometimes even conceive of a future for themselves.").
81 Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in
Report of the Secretary's Task Force on Youth Suicide 3-110,
3-128 (1989), cited in Nancy Tenney, The ConstitutionalImperative of Reality in Public School Curricula:Untruths About Homosex-
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In 1993, the Committee on Adolescence of the
American Academy of Pediatrics determined that
in struggling to reconcile their sexual identities
with negative social pressures, gay and lesbian
youth confront a "lack of accurate knowledge, [a]
scarcity of positive role models, and an absence of

opportunity for open discussion. Such rejection
may lead to isolation, run-away behavior, homelessness, domestic violence, depression, suicide,
substance abuse, and school or job failure."' 0 In
1989, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services released a study as part of the Report of
the Secretary of Health and Human Services Task
Force on Youth Suicide that concluded that "gay
youth are 2 to 3 times more likely to attempt suicide than other young people . . . and may comprise up to 30 percent of completed youth suicides annually.""'
The paucity of gay and lesbian role models in
schools harms not only gay students, but heterosexual students as well, considering that all students benefit significantly from their exposure to
reputable authority figures from differing religions, races, genders, ethnicities, and sexual orientations.8 2 In fact, the shortage of gay and lesbian role models in schools implicitly condones
homophobic attitudes and violence against those
students who identify themselves, or are identified
3
(whether accurately or not), as lesbian or gay.
uality as a Violation of the FirstAmendment, 60 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1599, 1613 n.63 (1995) (reporting that within months of the
Report's release, Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of HHS
under President Bush, attacked the portion of the Report
that advocated ending discrimination against gay and lesbian
youth, stating "I am strongly committed to advancing traditional family values .... In my opinion, the views expressed in
the paper run contrary to that aim."). See also Joyce Murdoch, Gay Youths' Deadly Despair: High Rate of Suicide Attempts
Tracked, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at Al; Eve KosofskySedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay, 29 SOCIAL TEXT 18

(1991) (examining the experiences of gay and lesbian children forced to undergo "reparative" therapy).
82 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has clarified that students
have a First Amendment right to receive information which
precludes school administrators from intentionally suppressing access to ideas. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 880 (1982); Keyishian v. Board of Educ., 385 U.S. 589,
603 ((quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.) aff'd 326 U.S. 1 (1945)
(alteration in original)) ("The classroom is peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas .... The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.").
83
See Arthur Lipkin, Project 1. Gay and Lesbian Stu-
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The Senators' comments also suggest that there
are no excellent gay and lesbian schoolteachers
who serve as role models to both gay and straight
students. Not only are there thousands of highly
competent gay men and lesbians educating children in the schools today,8 4 it is highly likely that
of all of the teachers that Senators Ashcroft and
Nickles valued as excellent role models for themselves, one or more was gay.
3.

"Ty Fox" as Red Herring

The Senators' contention that ENDA would
have protected Jeffrey Bruton, the suburban Virginia coach and teacher, from being forced to resign from his position as a result of having appeared in gay pornographic videos is baseless.
ENDA would prohibit covered employers from
subjecting employees or candidates for employment "to a different standard or different treatment

. . .

85
on the basis of sexual orientation."

Presumably, Bruton was not treated any differently by his school administration than the administration would have treated any other schoolteacher who had appeared in pornographic films,
regardless of whether the films were "straight" or
"gay." The grounds for Bruton's discipline appear not to have been Bruton's sexual orientation, which still has not been publicly disclosed,
but the fact that he was a pornographic video star.
It appears that poorjudgment, not sexual orientation, was what precipitated Bruton's discipline.
Thus, contrary to the Senators' warnings, ENDA
likely would not have protected Bruton against
86
any adverse employment action by the school.

4.

Effects of Existing State Non-Discrimination
Statutes

The Senators' concern that ENDA would enable gay and lesbian teachers to infuse their curricula with gay and lesbian topics is belied by the
effects of state and local laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Today, teachers in eleven states and over 100 local
jurisdictions are protected from employment discrimination by ENDA-like statutes.8 7 In addition,
millions of children are educated in school districts controlled by cities and counties with nondiscrimination ordinances. There is no evidence
that gay and lesbian teachers in these districts
have sought protection in anti-discrimination statutes for proselytizing on homosexuality in
schools.88 The fact that ENDA-like statutes at the
state and local level have not enabled gay and lesbian teachers to proselytize is a strong indication
that ENDA would not have the reverse effect if it
were enacted.
IV.

THE CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF
GAY PEOPLE FROM TEACHING
POSITIONS WOULD VIOLATE THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Not only are the concerns espoused by Senators
Ashcroft and Nickles concerning gay people in
teaching jobs negated by both the successful and
productive work of lesbian and gay teachers in
schools today and findings concerning the nature
of homosexuality itself, the Senators' opinions
beg the question of whether school administrators

dents Find Acceptance in their School Community, TEACHING TOLERANCE 25 (Fall 1992) ("Of all the minorities in
American school populations, young gays and lesbians are
among the most frequently ridiculed, victimized and
shunned."), cited in Nancy Tenney, The ConstitutionalImperative of Reality in Public School Curricula:Untruths About Homosexuality as a Violation of the First Amendment," 60 BROOK. L. REv.
1599, 1610 n.44 (1995); see alsoJoyce Hunter, Violence Against
Lesbian and Male Gay Youths, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE

ENDA § 4.
ENDA's construction provision confirms this assessment by clarifying that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit a covered entity from enforcing rules regarding nonprivate sexual conduct, if the rules of conduct

295, 297 (1990) (In study of 500 gay and lesbian youths, 40%
were found to have experienced "violent physical attacks").
One study has found that gays and lesbians face victimization
more frequently than any other minority group. See PETER

found that there was no perceptible spike in litigation of any

FINN & TAYLOR McNEIL, THE RESPONSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTO BIAS
(1987).
84 See generally ONE

TICE SYSTEM

CRIME:

AN

TEACHER IN

EXPLORATORY

10:

REVIEW

2

GAY AND LESBIAN EDU-

CATORs TELL THEIR STOIES (Kevin Jennings ed., 1994); RITA
M. KISSEN, THE LAST CLOSET: THE REAL LvES OF LESBIAN AND
GAY TEACHERS (1996).

85
86

are designed for, and uniformly applied to, all individuals regardless of sexual orientation." ENDA § 11.
87 See supra note 16.
88

In fact, a recent General Accounting Office report

kind, including claims brought by lesbian and gay schoolteachers, in those states with ENDA-like statutes in place. See
Gen'l Acct. Off. Rep. on States' Experiences with Sexual Orientation Discrimination Laws B-277688, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 206 (Oct. 24, 1997) (finding that in states with sexual
orientation non-discrimination statutes in effect, "relatively
few complaints of discrimination in employment on the basis

of sexual orientation were filed annually: and that there was
not evidence "of large numbers of complaints immediately
after the implementation of the sexual orientation statutes.")
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could categorically disqualify lesbians and gay
men from teaching jobs at all. The exclusion of
gay and lesbian people from teaching positions
solely on the theory that they are intrinsically immoral and, thus, bad role models for children
likely would violate the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A.

Constitutional Due Process and the
Emergence of the "Fitness to Teach" Test

With a few striking exceptions, such as Gaylord,
courts over the last several decades have recognized that constitutional due process principles
forbid school administrators from basing hiring
and promotion decisions on standards that are
not rationally related to teaching ability. The
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that the government afford citizens "due
process" before depriving them of life, liberty, or
property."9 Like the Equal Protection Clause, the
Due Process Clause requires that government actions be at least rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. 9°1 Thus, no person can be
denied public employment based on factors that
are unconnected with the responsibilities of that
employment.'
1. Norton v. Macy: The Irrelevance of Homosexual
Orientation in Public Employment
Some courts have correctly recognized that homosexual orientation alone does not affect the eligibility of an individual for public employment.
For example, in Norton v. Macy,92 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal of
a federal employee from ajob at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for
"homosexual behavior" outside of working hours,
which the U.S. Civil Service Commission labeled
"immoral."9 -" The court held that the government
89

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also LAURENCE H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

§ 15-1 at 1302-04 (2d

ed. 1988).
90 See, e.g., Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
91 See generally Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
92 See generally 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
93 See id. at 1164-65. See also Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182,
184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that the government may
not rely on mere allegations of homosexuality to discharge
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had failed to demonstrate that his "immoral" behavior would have an "ascertainable deleterious
effect on the efficiency of the service" he provided
in his job. 94 The court determined further that:

"[a] pronouncement of "immorality" tends to discourage careful analysis because it unavoidably
connotes a violation of divine, Olympian, or
' 95
otherwise universal standards of rectitude."
The court also found that the government had
failed to establish a rational relationship between
Mr. Norton's homosexuality and any threat to the
efficiency of NASA operations, which was the government's only justification for the dismissal."6
2.

Norton Applied to Gay and Lesbian Teachers

Some courts have applied the "effect on service" principle articulated in Norton in adjudicating cases involving gay and lesbian teachers, correctly holding that sexual orientation may be a
factor in public schoolteacher employment decisions only where it may impact the teacher's "fitness to teach." For example, in Morrison v. State
Board of Education,97 the California Supreme
Court held that the state Board of Education
could not revoke Marc Morrison's "life diploma"
(i.e., state teaching certificate) on the grounds of
a "limited, non-criminal physical relationship ...
of a homosexual nature."9 8 Morrison was a
schoolteacher in the Lowell, California Joint
School District where he maintained a satisfactory
performance record. 99 During his employment in
the Lowell public school system, Morrison became friends with Fred Schneringer, another public schoolteacher. 10 0 In a period of marital difficulties, Mr. Schneringer had sex with Morrison on
four separate occasions in a one-week period. I°
One year after Schneringer and Morrison ended
their affair, Schneringer reported Morrison's homosexuality to the Superintendent of the Lowell
Joint School District, which resulted in the California Board of Education revoking Morrison's
an employee, but
finds immoral and
employee's fitness
94 Norton, 417

instead must identify specific conduct it
demonstrate how such conduct affects the
for position).
F.2d at 1165.

95

Id.

96

See id.
461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969) (en banc).
Id. at 377-78.
See id. at 377.

97
98

99
100
101

See id.
See id. at 377-78.
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life diploma. 10 2

teach."' 1

In reversing the revocation, the court recognized that the Board of Education failed to present any evidence indicating that Morrison "had
ever committed any act of misconduct whatsoever
while teaching[,]" and that "uninformed speculation or conjecture" about immorality was insufficient grounds to terminate Morrison's teaching
privileges.103 The court held that an admission of
homosexual conduct, absent evidence of "unfitness to teach," was insufficient grounds for the
04
revocation. 1
Morrison is not the only case that properly accords due process protection to gay and lesbian
teachers terminated on the basis of vague notions
of morality, and without regard to teaching ability
and effectiveness. In Board of Education v. Jack
M.,1 0 5 the California Supreme Court, citing Morrison, held that a teacher arrested for "homosexual
solicitation" was inappropriately fired from his elementary school teaching position because the
teacher's arrest "did not demonstrate unfitness to

School District,1 0 7

See id. at 378.
Id. at 378, 393.
104
Id. at 391. The court specified the following criteria
for determining "unfitness to teach":
[Tihe likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected students or fellow teachers, the degree of such adversity anticipated, the proximity or remoteness in time
of the conduct, the type of teaching certificate held by
the party involved, the extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct, the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives resulting

lock." Id. at 1062-63. See also Drake v. Covington County Bd.
of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 979 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (holding
that an Alabama statute allowing termination of a teacher
based on immorality was not facially unconstitutional due to
vagueness, but violated Drake's constitutional right to privacy
as applied to her); Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania,
339 A.2d 850, 853 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (denying unwed
pregnant teachers a leave of absence, thus terminating their
employment, violates Section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, which prohibited discrimination based
on sex).
112
See Erb v. Iowa State Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 216
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1974). In Erb, the Iowa Supreme Court
restored Richard Erb's high school teaching certificate,
which had been revoked when the other teacher's husband
brought to the school board's attention that Erb had been
involved in an adulterous affair with another teacher (who
was leaving the teaching profession to pursue a different career). See id. at 341. The court found notable that numerous
witnesses, including Erb's principle and superintendent, testified that his teaching was highly rated and was unaffected
by the affair. See id. The court in Erb did not find evidence
"of a reasonable likelihood that the teacher's retention
in the
profession [would] adversely affect the school community."
Id. at 344.
113 See Thompson v. Southwest Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp.
1170 (W.D. Mo. 1980). In Thompson, the plaintiff was a second grade teacher who was cohabiting with a man to whom
she was not married. See id. at 1173. Her ability as a teacher
was never questioned. See id. at 1175. She was removed due
to fear of a public outcry over the matter. See id. at 1183. The
court stated that the "fact that.some parents may have an adverse attitude towards plaintiff is not sufficient evidence...
that an attitude would prevail in the classroom that would undermine the learning environment." Id.
114
716 P.2d 724 (Or. 1986) (en banc).

102

103

in the conduct .... and the extent to which disciplinary

action may inflict an adverse impact or chilling effect
upon constitutional fights of the teacher involved or
other teachers.
Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
105
19 Cal.3d 691 (1977).
106
Id. at 694.
107
233 N.E.2d 143 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1967).
108

Id. at 146.

109
110

216 N.W. 2d 339 (Iowa 1974).
Id. at 343.

See, e.g., Ponton v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 632 F.
Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1986). In Ponton, an unwed pregnant
teacher was given the choice of quitting, getting married, or
taking an unpaid leave of absence when it became known
that she was pregnant. See id. at 1059. A Virginia federal
court sided with Ponton, who claimed that the school board's
actions violated her Constitutional right to privacy and constituted sex discrimination proscribed by Title VII. See id. at
1061. The court held that there was no evidence that being
pregnant out of wedlock indicated some moral defect that
would render Ponton unfit to teach, "no evidence that [she]
intended to proselytize her students regarding the issue of
unwed pregnancy[,]" and no danger that her being pregnant
out of wedlock would be seen as "a School Board-sponsored
statement regarding the desirability of pregnancy out of wed111

6

In Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City
the Ohio Court of Common

Pleas found that as long as a teacher's private conduct does not affect his professional achievement,
his "private acts are his own business and may not
be the basis of discipline."1 0 8 Similarly, in Erb v.
Iowa State Board of Public Instruction,0 9 the Iowa
Supreme Court held that in determining whether
an individual is qualified to serve as a schoolteacher, "the personal moral views of board members cannot be relevant." 110 Following this approach, courts across the nation began
invalidating public schoolteacher terminations on
such "immorality" grounds as unwed pregnancy,' 11 adultery,' 12 and unmarried cohabita'
tion. 13
A more recent case reminiscent of Morrison is
Ross v. Springfield School District No. 19.' 14 In Ross,
the Supreme Court of Oregon invalidated a
schoolteacher's discharge for "immorality" where
the determination of immorality was based solely
on references to "community moral standards"
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and where the termination was in no way based
on negative findings concerning the school15
teacher's fitness to teach. 5
B.

Equal Protection

Categorically disqualifying gay men and lesbians from teaching positions solely on the ground
that they are "not the right type of role models"
would also likely violate constitutional equal protection principles. The Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause prohibits state and local
governments from engaging in intentional invidious discrimination between otherwise similarly situated persons based on membership in a definable class, absent a rational basis for doing so.'' 6
Under the basic "mere rationality" standard of review for equal protection cases not involving a
"suspect class" (i.e., race, religion, etc.) or a fundamental right (e.g., speech), the court asks
"whether it is conceivable that the classification
bears a rational relationship to an end of government which is not prohibited by the Constitu-

tion."'
1.

17

Romer v. Evans

In its landmark 1996 Romer v. Evans"18 decision,
the Supreme Court relied upon the Constitution's
equal protection guarantee to protect the interests of gay people. Romer held that Amendment 2
to the Colorado Constitution violated the Equal
Protection Clause insofar as it failed to further a
proper legislative end by prohibiting an entire
class of persons (i.e., gay and lesbian Coloradans)
from seeking legislation to redress injustices.'1
Romer elucidated what the Supreme Court consid115

See id. at 730-31.
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ers not to be a rational basis for discrimination
against gay people. The state had argued that the
rationale for Amendment 2 included "respect for
other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who
have personal or religious objections to homosexuality."' 2 1 Justice Kennedy, writing for the major-

ity, rejected the state's rationale, declaring that
animosity toward the class of homosexuals is not a
legitimate basis for state action. 12 1 Justice Kennedy asserted that Amendment 2 "is at once too
narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a
single trait and then denies them protection
across the board."' 122 He wrote that Amendment

2 "classifie[d] homosexuals" as "unequal to every' 12 3
one else. This Colorado cannot do."

To a certain extent, Romer redeems the
Supreme Court's earlier infamous decision affecting gay and lesbian civil rights, Bowers v. Hardwick. 124 In Hardwick, the Supreme Court found
that the Georgia sodomy statute, which prohibits
private, consensual sodomy between two adults,
does not run afoul of an individual's right to privacy as an element of the Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process,1 25 which, as discussed above,
prohibits state restrictions on human conduct
that constitute an unreasonable denial of an individual's "life, liberty, or property.' ' 1 26 Hardwick
not only armed states with the Supreme Court's
imprimatur to continue criminalizing homosexual
sexual relations, 127 but had the broader effect of
legitimizing judicial prejudices against gay men
and lesbians in matters unrelated to sexual relations. 128
Hardwick generated intense negative scholarly
criticism against the Supreme Court, 129 particu-

larly because it denied gay people the type of per-

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (a State shall not
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see also TRIBE, supra note 89, §§ 16-1, 16-2,
at 1436-43.
117 JOHN E. NOWAK et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.1, at

127
See Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo.
1986) (en banc) (relying on the United States Supreme
Court's two-week-old decision in Hardwick, the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld that state's sodomy law from a privacy
challenge); Louisiana v. Neal, 500 So.2d 374, 378 (La. 1987)
(upholding anti-solicitation and sodomy statutes relying on

524 (3d ed. 1986).
118 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).

Hardwick).
128
See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068,

116

119

See id. at 1629.
Id.
121
See id. at 1628-29.
122
Id. at 1628.
123 Id. at 1629.
124 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
125 See id. at 191, 194-96.
126 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; see also TRIBE, supra note
89, § 15-1, at 1302.
120

1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("After Hardwick it cannot logically be
asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm."). In large measure, some judges have misapplied Hardwick in starting from the premise that all homosexual conduct is equivalent to the homosexual sodomy at issue
in Hardwick. See Feldblum, supra note 46, at 283 (citing
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
129
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 -ARv.

SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

19981

sonal freedom to engage in private, consensual
sexual relationships it had accorded heterosexuals
in a series of important privacy decisions.°3 0 Criticism of Hardwick as a wrongly-decided decision intensified when it became known that Justice Lewis
F. Powell, the deciding vote on the Hardwick majority, later regretted voting to uphold the Georgia sodomy statute. In an October 18, 1990 lecture at New York University Law School, Justice
Powell was asked how he reconciled his support of
Roe v. Wade13' with his vote in Hardwick, to which
he responded "I think I probably made a mistake

table, or distinguishing" characteristic-a standard for the application of strict scrutiny-but indicated nevertheless that "it does seem dubious to
suggest that someone would choose to be homosexual, absent some genetic predisposition, given
the considerable discrimination leveled against
homosexuals."' "3

in that one.'

Romer and Nabozny evince an important evolution in the attitude of the American judiciary. No
doubt influenced by society's evolving understanding of the nature of sexual orientation, it appears that judges, like certain legislators, are
much less willing to enforce traditional anti-gay
prejudices and instead have begun to view gay
people as multi-faceted individuals entitled to the
political and social enfranchisement afforded all
Americans.
As a result, it is likely that a post-Romer court
would find that categorically excluding gay and
lesbian people from teaching positions for no
other government end than to endorse the antigay sentiments of only one sector of the community, would violate the right to equal protection of
the affected gay and lesbian people. Under basic
rational basis review, the level of scrutiny applied
in Romer, there is no constitutional violation if
"there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts"
that would provide a rational basis for the govern-

3.

Romer and Nabozny Applied to Gay and Lesbian
Teachers

1 32

2. Nabozny v. Podlesny
That Romer has to some extent eclipsed Hardwick as the benchmark for applying constitutional
protections to gay and lesbian Americans was evi-

dent in the case of Nabozny v. Podlesny.13 3 In Nabozny, Jamie Nabozny sued the Ashland, Wisconsin school district for, inter alia, violating his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection
by discriminating against him as a homosexual.
Nabozny argued that school administrators not
only ignored his requests for assistance in responding to continuous verbal and physical antigay abuse from fellow students, but also themselves mocked Nabozny's predicament. 34 Applying mere rational review scrutiny, the Seventh Circuit held that "ft]here can be little doubt that
homosexuals are an identifiable minority subjected to discrimination in our society," and that
"discrimination against Nabozny based on his sexual orientation . . . was unlawful.' 3 5 Having
found the board liable under basic rational review, the court refused to express an opinion on
whether sexual orientation is an "obvious, immuL. REv. 737, 799-802 (1989) (contending that the Hardwick
majority incorrectly applied the due process test); Thomas B.
Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by PersonalPredilection,

54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648, 655-56 (1987) (arguing that Hardwick
constitutes nothing more than the embodiment of the justices' anti-homosexual sentiment); Kendall Thomas, Beyond
the Privacy Principle,92 COL. L. REv. 1431, 1461 (1992) (posit-

ing that Hardwick illegitimately endorses cruel and unusual
punishment against homosexuals); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct," 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319,

325-330 (1994) (contending that Hardwick violates gay and
lesbian citizens' First Amendment expression rights).
130 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967) (right of
interracial couple to marry); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (right of unmarried persons to contraception); Roe v.

ment's conduct.13

7

It would be highly unlikely

that a court would be able to garner any rational
basis for a school board's categorical disqualification of gay men and lesbians from schoolteacher
positions for no other reason than the belief that
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); and Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to access
of contraceptive technology).
131 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
132 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
518-530 (1994), excerpted in RUBENSrEIN, supra note 46, at 245,
251. In confirming his remark to a reporter, he explained
"When I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a few
months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments." Id.
133
134
135
136

92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 449.

Id. at 457.
See id. at 457 n.10.

FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
313 (1993).
137
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gay people are intrinsically immoral and, thus, are
poor role models for children.
V. SENATORS MISCHARACTERIZE ENDA'S
EFFECTS ON TEACHERS' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. ENDA Would Not Alter Existing Caselaw
According Curricular and Pedagogical
Decisions to School Boards and School
Administrators
Senator Ashcroft's opposition to employment
non-discrimination protection for what he terms
"open homosexual leaders" and "gay activists, as
teachers in the fifth grade," presupposes that
ENDA's passage would permit gay and lesbian
teachers to proselytize in the classroom. Such a
characterization of ENDA's scope is fundamentally incorrect. ENDA's only function is to ensure
that employees and candidates are judged by their
ability to do their job and not on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Thus, ENDA generally would
not affect the ability of school boards and school
administrators to control the classroom speech of
teachers.
1. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier and its
Progeny Confirm the Power of School Boards Over
Reasonable Restrictions on In-Classroom Speech
The Supreme Court has long recognized that
decisions about the appropriateness of classroom
curricula are the province of school boards and
school administrators. Although the Court has acknowledged that it cannot "be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,"' 38 it has held consistently that
the constitutional rights of teachers and students
in school cannot be as extensive as they are
outside the schoolhouse. School officials must
138 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (allowing students, suspended for
wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam war, to express
controversial opinions as long as they did not materially and
substantially interfere with the discipline in or operation of
the school, or collide with the fights of others).
139 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
140
See id. at 266.
141 Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
142
Id. (quoting Pery, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7) (emphasis ad-

have control over curriculum and conduct in order to ensure that reasonably uniform instruction
standards are applied in the classroom setting.
Although no Supreme Court precedent directly
addresses the scope of the First Amendment
rights of teachers inthe classroom, the case of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,13 9 which addresses the in-school free speech rights of students, has provided the judicial construct upon
which lower courts have based standards for the
protection of in-school teacher speech. The
Supreme Court in Hazelwood found that school officials did not violate the free speech right of students by deleting two pages of articles concerning
pregnancy and divorce from the school newspaper. 40 It explained that where school facilities
have not been opened for "indiscriminate use by
the general public;" the school is not a public forum.'

41

As a result, "school officials may impose

reasonable restrictions on the speech of students,
teachers, and other members of the school community."' 142 The court held that reasonable restrictions on in-school speech, however, must be reasonably related to "legitimate pedagogical
1

concerns." 43

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was the
first Federal Circuit Court to apply Hazelwood to
the in-class free speech rights of teachers. In
Bishop v. Aronov,144 the court found that a memorandum from the head of a state university department, instructing a professor to refrain from
interjecting religious discussions into his classes,
did not violate the professor's First Amendment
rights because the memorandum's restrictions
only applied to the classroom speech of the professor "wherever he purports to conduct a class
for the University."

145

The First Circuit similarly relied upon Hazelwood in its 1993 Ward v. Hickey146 decision, where
it rejected a high school teacher's First Amendment claim against her local school board for re-

ded).
143 Id. at 273. The court identified at least three such
concerns: (1) "that participants learn whatever the activity is
designed to teach," (2) "that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity," and (3) "that the views of the individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to the school." Id. at 271.
144 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
145 Id. at 1075-76.
146 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
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fusing to rehire her in part because she had led a
discussion in a ninth-grade biology class of the
abortion of Down's Syndrome fetuses. 14 7 The

court stated: "we find that a school committee
may regulate a teacher's classroom speech if: (1)
the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical concern; and (2) the school provided
the teacher with notice of what conduct was prohibited[.] "148
2. Proselytizing is Not Protected In-Classroom Speech
Senator Aschroft's concerns notwithstanding,
courts have held that school administrators may
properly restrict in-classroom proselytizing or recruitment for political or social causes by teachers. In Burns v. Rovaldi,14 9 a Connecticut federal
district court upheld the dismissal of a public
teacher who incorporated into his penmanship
class a pen-pal program between his students and
his fiancee through which the students received
letters advocating communism and attacking the
American capitalist system.'

50

nature of sexual orientation and would recognize
that proselytizing or otherwise attempting to "convert" students to homosexuality would be a fundamentally futile exercise. Moreover, given that
homophobia remains a serious societal affliction,
and the fact that lesbian and gay schoolteachers
continue to be politically useful targets for antigay activists, it is hard to believe that lesbian and
gay schoolteachers would put their jobs at risk by
attempting to "recruit" students into homosexuality, regardless of the futility of the effort. In addition, the belief that ENDA somehow would empower lesbian and gay schoolteachers to
proselytize without recourse not only misconstrues the narrow scope of ENDA (i.e., prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation), but also is negated by the
track record of ENDA-like laws in ten states and
many local jurisdictions. There is no recorded instance of any of these laws being used to protect
lesbian or gay schoolteachers from disciplinary ac1 54
tion for any form of proselytization.

Other courts have

5'

held similarly,' holding that proselytization of
any kind is contrary to the interest of the state in
preserving the educational process and properly
socializing children. In James v. Board of Education,1 52 the Second Circuit found that "[w]hen a
teacher is only content if he persuades his students that his values and only his values ought to
be their values, then it is not unreasonable to expect the state to protect impressionable children

B.

Teachers' Out-of-School Speech is
Constitutionally Protected

The notion that ENDA would protect lesbian
and gay public schoolteachers for proselytizing on
homosexuality in public schools also is inconsistent with the nature and origins of homosexuality.
Presumably, most lesbian and gay public schoolteachers understand the generally unchangeable

Senator Ashcroft's suggestion that a school
board should be permitted to bar the employment of "open homosexual leaders" and "gay activists" also mistakenly connotes that passage of
ENDA somehow would alter the ability of school
boards to govern the out-of-school speech of
teachers. It appears that Senator Ashcroft is
under the mistaken belief that school boards and
school administrators now have the ability to discriminate against teachers who are politically active and that ENDA would interfere with this ability. Because ENDA would only prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual

See id. at 452.
Id. (citation omitted). The Ward court noted that "in
this circuit, we have determined the propriety of school regulations by considering circumstances such as age and sophistication of students, relationship between teaching method
and valid educational objectives, and context and manner of
presentation." Id. The court cited to prior First Circuit precedent, such as Mailloux v.Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.
1971). The Mailloux court had recognized that
free speech does not grant teachers a license to say or
write in class whatever they may feel like, and that the
propriety of regulations or sanctions must depend on
such circumstances as the age and sophistication of the
students, the closeness of the relation between the specific technique used and some concededly valid educa-

tional objective, and the context and manner of presentation.
Id. at 1243; see also Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (lst
Cir. 1969) (noting that "the offensiveness of language and
the particular propriety or impropriety is dependent on the
circumstances of the utterance").
149 477 F. Supp. 270-71, 276 (D. Conn. 1979).
150
Id. at 270, 276.
15' See Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623,
632 (2d Cir. 1972); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566,
573 (2d Cir. 1972).
152
461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).
153
Id. at 573.
154
See supra note 16.

53
from such dogmatism."1

147
148
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orientation, it likely would have no impact on the
well-settled body of law governing teachers' rights
to free speech outside of the classroom.
The principal Supreme Court decision clarifying the nature of teachers' free speech rights
outside of the classroom is Pickering v. Board ofEducation.155 In Pickering, the Court invalidated as
unconstitutional the firing of a teacher following
the publication in a local newspaper of the
teacher's letter to the editor criticizing the

government employees' speech determines the
government's ability to restrict that speech. For
example, in Connick v. Myers,160 the Supreme
Court denied the claim of an assistant district attorney who challenged her dismissal, which followed her distribution of a questionnaire to colleagues about their work conditions.' 61 The
Court held that the employee's expression was
merely internal workplace speech, did not address
a matter of public concern and, therefore, was not

1
board's financial activities.

protected by the First Amendment.162 By con-

The Court recognized that, in free speech cases
involving public schoolteachers, there is a conflict
between the state's interest as an employer in controlling the speech of its employees and the expressive interests of those employees. Citing its
earlier decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the
Court held that school boards may not compel
teachers "to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in

trast, the Court in Rankin v. McPherson' 63 invalidated the dismissal of a government employee
who, following the assassination attempt against
President Ronald Reagan, stated to a co-worker:
"[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get

56

57

1
which they work."'

In reaching this conclusion, the Court implemented a balancing test that weighs "the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees."' 158 This test allows a school to restrict or

punish a public schoolteacher's speech on matters of public concern only if the speech would
harm the school's ability to operate efficiently or
inhibit the teacher's ability to carry out his or her
duties. In implementing this test, the Court held
that school boards must respect a teacher's right
to expression outside the classroom because
there, a teacher's interest in free expression exceeds any school interest in suppressing the expression as a way of promoting its own interests.

1 59

156

157

391 U.S. 563 (1969).
See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
Id. at 568 (Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.

589, 606 (1967) (holding that states may not punish teachers
for out-of-school associations absent a compelling state inter-

est)).
158

Id.

159

See
461
See
See

160
161
162

The Court held that the employee's

speech could be "fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern" and
16 5
thus was protected by the Free Speech clause.

Lower courts have applied the Pickering rule to
protect teachers from retaliation for their expression about sexual orientation. In National Gay
Task Force v. Board of Education,166 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which an evenly split
Supreme Court affirmed, invalidated a portion of
Oklahoma's "Helm Bill," which replicated the language of the infamous anti-gay California Briggs
Initiative. 167 The Tenth Circuit found that the
prohibition against "advocating ... encouraging

or promoting public or private homosexual activity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that
such conduct will come to the attention of school
children or school employees" was unconstitutionally overbroad.' 6 8 Citing Pickering, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that although the state has an interest in regulating schoolteacher speech, it can
do so only when the expression "results in a material or substantial . . . disruption in the normal
activities of the school."'1 6" The Court concluded

that the Oklahoma Board of Education had

Pickering's progeny confirms that the nature of
155

him."' 164

id. at 572.
U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
id. at 154.
id.

"made no such showing."' 170 In the 1974 Acanfora
163

483 U.S. 378 (1987).

Id. at 381.
Id. at 384 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146).
166 729 F.2d 1270, (10th Cir. 1984), affd by an equally divided Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
167 729 F.2d at 1272.
168
Id. at 1272, 1275.
Id. at 1274, also citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
169
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
164
165

170

Id.
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v. Board of Education1 7 1 case, the Supreme Court
let stand a Fourth Circuit ruling that a gay high
school teacher's statements in press and television
interviews regarding his sexuality did not disrupt
his workplace and were protected under the First
Amendment. 72 Similarly, in Aumiller v. University
of Delaware,173 the Delaware Federal District Court
found thatAumiller's public statements about homosexuality did not "impede[ ] his performance
of his daily duties, substantially disrupt[ ] the University, violate[ ] an express need for confidentiality, or disrupt[ ] his working relationship with his
74
superiors."1
In sum, it is unlikely that a school board or
school administrator would succeed in disciplining a schoolteacher for "gay activism" or "homosexual leadership" outside of the classroom. Such
expression addresses a matter of public concern
(i.e., equal rights for lesbians and gay men) and
most likely would not disrupt school activities nor
diminish the teacher's ability to carry out his or
her duties.
Gay and Lesbian Teachers' Out-ofClassroom "PDAs" Are Constitutionally
Protected

C.

The argument made on the Senate floor that
491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 499. The First Amendment principle enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in Acanfora was enforced a few
years later in Aumiller v. University of Delaware, by a Delaware Federal district court. See 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del.
1977). In Aumiller, the court found that Aumiller's public
statements about homosexuality did not "impede[] his performance of his daily duties, substantially disrupt[ ] the University, violate[ ] an express need for confidentiality, or disrupt[ ] his working relationship with his superiors." Id. at
1312. Similarly, in National Gay Task Force, the Supreme
Court let stand a Tenth Circuit decision upholding a state
statute's constitutionality insofar as it provided for the dismissal for engaging in "public homosexual conduct," but unconstitutionally overbroad and violative of the First Amendment
insofar as "public homosexual conduct" included "advocacy."
729 F.2d at 1273-74. The Court opined that the state's right
in regulating the speech of its employees overcomes the
teacher's free speech rights only when the free speech results
in a substantial or material interference or disruption in
school activities, neither of which was demonstrated by the
State in this case. Id. at 1274-75.
173 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
174 Id. at 1273.
175 142 CONG. REc S9986, S9993 (daily ed. Sept. 6,1996)
(statement of Sen. Hatch). These assertions are quite reminiscent of those articulated by Lynn H. Greene, an anti-gay
activist in Oregon who fought for the rejection of an antidiscrimination ordinance in Eugene, Oregon by declaring
171

172

under ENDA, a school board would be prohibited
from "tak[ing] action" against a male teacher who
"during nonschool hours and in public, holds
hands, walks arm in arm with his [boy]friend, and
engages in some kissing17

5

begs the question of

Whether school boards can now, absent ENDA,
regulate out-of-classroom PDAs in general and
proscribe only same-sex out-of-classroom PDAs
specifically. They cannot. This argument appears
to overlook the fact that, regardless of whether
ENDA is enacted, the Constitution's free speech
and equal protection guarantees would forbid a
school board or school administrator from implementing such a blatant double standard.
1. PDAs as Constitutionally Protected Speech
Although most public schoolteachers, like
other public employees, may be dismissed without
cause, 176 they cannot be dismissed or otherwise
disciplined as a result of their exercise of a constitutional right. 17 7 Moreover, although constitu-

tional protection of individual expression traditionally has been interpreted as covering only
speaking or writing, contemporary courts have accorded such protection to "symbolic" or political
speech as well.'

78

Public displays of affection be-

tween a gay or lesbian teacher and another perthat the ordinance "would encourage homosexuals to kiss,
caress and dance in public, slap fannies, ask heterosexuals
for dates at places of employment or in bars, and will even
allow for the occasional touching of the genitals." Gay Rights
Voted Down in Eugene, S.F. CHRON., date unknown (quoted in
HARBECK, supra note 37, at 55).
176
See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972) (finding that public employees may be discharged
without cause and without a prior hearing where there is no
contractual expectancy of continued employment).
177 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563 (prohibiting the dismissal of public employees for exercising free speech rights in
absence of overriding considerations regarding workplace
harmony and discipline); cf Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977) (public schoolteacher's exercise of constitutional right may contribute to
dismissal or other discipline as long as exercise of right not
primary motivating factor justifying employment action).
178
See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(deeming that draft card burning prohibition is not related
to expression because law "does not distinguish between public and private destruction"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965) (picketing); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picketing); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (placing
peace symbols on, and then displaying, American flag); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearingjacket bearing
words "Fuck the Draft"); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
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son of the same sex during nonschool hours may
be considered a form of such protected "symbolic" or political speech.'

79

Courts have dis-

agreed on the kinds of same-sex expressions, however, that could be deemed protectible speech.
a. Fricke v. Lynch
In Fricke v. Lynch, 8" a Federal District Court in
Rhode Island held that a male student's plan to
take a male date to his senior prom had "significant expressive content" and thus was protected
by the First Amendment as symbolic speech. 8"
Aaron Fricke identified himself as gay 'to his
school community and requested permission to
take a male escort to the prom. The school denied Fricke's request, claiming that Aaron's attending the prom with a same-sex escort may incite violence and may result in Aaron or his escort
being attacked by other students.18 2 Disagreeing,

the court found that although the action of going
to a prom may not have expressive import for
most people, it did for Fricke.18

3

The court noted

further that Fricke "wants to go because he feels
he has a right to attend and participate just like all
other students and that it would be dishonest to
his own sexual identity to take a girl to the
dance."' 18 4 Fricke also testified that he thought

his attendance "would have a certain political element and would be a statement for equal rights
18 5
and human rights."'

The Fricke court applied the Supreme Court's
United States v. O'Brien test,' 86 which governs the
review of regulations that incidentally infringe
upon an individual's expression, and found that
the school's denial of Fricke's request violated his
(1966) (remaining in segregated facility); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (loitering and picketing);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (displaying red

flag).

See TRIBE, supra note 89, § 12-7, at 827-28 (positing
179
that all "speech" is a combination of expression and conduct
and that distinctions between speech and conduct are less
dispositive of the permissibility of a restriction than is the basis for the restriction). See aLso David Cole and William N.
Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment
Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994) (positing that discrimination against
a gay or lesbian individual on the basis of expressive activity
that identifies the individual as a homosexual should be
viewed as a violation of the individual's free speech right).
180 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).

181
182

183

Id. at 388.
Id. at 383-84.
See id.
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freedom of expression right because the school
could have taken "security measures to control
the risk of harm" posed by Fricke's symbolic
speech. 187 The Fricke court also noted that in order for the state to restrict a "particular expression of opinion," it must "show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."1 88
b.

Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Co.

Fricke is not the only case in which a court has
held that certain types of homosexual expression
have symbolic or political importance. In Gay Law
Students Association v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. ("P7T'),'19 the California Supreme
Court held that the policies and practices of the
public telephone utility denying employment to
"manifest" homosexuals, or other persons "who
make an issue of their homosexuality" violated
both the California and Federal Equal Protection
Clauses and the state labor code.' 9° The PTT
court held that employee expression involving
self-identification as homosexual, speech that "defends" homosexuality, or speech that discloses
personal affiliation with gay rights organizations,
can be considered protectible political speech. 19
The court acknowledged that "one important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce
homosexual individuals to 'come out of the
closet'. ... "192 Accordingly, the court held that
PTT's discriminatory policies constituted an "attempt to coerce or influence. . .employees...
to... refrain from adopting [a] particular course
14
185

id. at 385.
Id.

186
391 U.S. at 378-80. O'Brien asks the following four
questions:
(1) was the regulation within the constitutional power of
government, (2) did it further an important or substantial government interest, (3) was the governmental inter-

est unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
(4) was the incidental restriction of alleged first amendment freedoms no greater than essential to further that
interest?
Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 385 (citing application of O'Brien test
by Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
187 Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 385.
188 Id. at 386.
189 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488 (1979).
19(
Id. at 488.
1,1 Id.
192 Id.

1998]
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or line of political activity," in violation of these
19 3
employees' First Amendment rights.
c.

Rowland v. Mad River Local School District

The Sixth Circuit's Rowland v. Mad River Local
School District'94 decision, however, argues against
treating an expression of homosexuality as a matter of public concern satisfying the Pickering test.' 9 5 Marjorie Rowland, a high school gui-

dance counselor, was transferred to a position
with no student contact and then was told her
contract would not be renewed because she had
talked about her bisexuality with coworkers. 19 6
The Sixth Circuit rejected Rowland's First
Amendment challenge, holding that because
Rowland had discussed her bisexuality with her
coworkers privately and in confidence, and because "[t] here was absolutely no evidence of any
public concern in the community ...with the is-

sue of bisexuality among school personnel," Rowland's statements about her bisexuality did not
touch a matter of public concern and thus mer197
ited no First Amendment protection.
Rowland was wrongly decided. Most notably, in
discounting Marjorie Rowland's speech as "private," the Sixth Circuit inappropriately ignored
the fact that the Mad River Local School District
disciplined Rowland because of how the community
would have reacted to her bisexuality. In his dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari,
Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justice Marshall, acknowledged correctly that the homosexuality or bisexuality of a schoolteacher is a matter
of public concern, regardless of whether that
schoolteacher's sexual orientation is announced
to the public.'98
Even if Rowland had been correctly decided,
however, it could easily be distinguished from the
193

Id. at 487.

194

730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).

195 Id. at 449. Rowland relied on the Supreme Court's
Connick v. Myers decision, which held that:

when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983).
196 See Rowland, 730 F.2d at 446.
197
Id. at 449.
198 See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S.

case of a gay or lesbian schoolteacher who is disciplined for engaging in out-of-classroom same-sex
PDAs. Unlike Rowland's confidential conversations with her colleagues, PDAs, by their nature,
are clearly "public."
d.

Shahar v. Bowers

Another case that muddles the free speech
rights of gay and lesbian schoolteachers is the
Eleventh Circuit's relatively recent Shahar v. Bowers' 99 decision. Although not a case dealing with
schoolteachers specifically, Shahar does address
the expression rights of gay and lesbian public
employees and, thus, is relevant to this analysis.
In Shahar, Georgia Attorney General Michael J.
Bowers-of Bowers v. Hardwick fame-succeeded
at persuading the Eleventh Circuit that he violated no law when he withdrew a job offer to an
attorney, Robin Shahar, on the basis that Shahar
had entered into a lesbian marriage. 2° Applying
the Pickering balancing test, the court found that
the Attorney General's interest in hiring assistant
attorneys general "in whom he has trust" outweighed Shahar's right to free speech (as exercised in her same-sex marriage ceremony).2'0

Al-

luding to Hardwick, the court found relevant that
the Attorney General "had already engaged in
and won a recent battle about homosexual sodomy,"21 2 and that it was reasonable for Bowers to
have considered that Shahar's wedding could
have affected her "credibility," would have "interfere[d] with the Department's ability to handle
certain kinds of controversial matters" involving
gay people, and would "create other difficulties
within the department which would be likely to
harm the public perception of the Department."' 2 1 3 Ruling in favor of Bowers, the Eleventh

Circuit reasoned that:
1009, 1012 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) denying cert. to
730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984). See alsoJos G6mez, The Public
Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1 L. &
INEQ. J. 121 (1983) (arguing that the expression of lesbian/
gay "personhood," whether in public or private, is entitled to
constitutional protection and that social pressure on gay men
and lesbians to closet their sexual orientation and physical
manifestations thereof, is tantamount to impermissible
forced expression under First Amendment analysis).
199 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66
U.S.L.W. 3338 (Jan. 12, 1998).
200
Id. at 1100.
201
202
203

Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1105.
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[G]overnment employees who have access to their employers confidences or who act as spokespersons for
their employers, as well as those employees with some
policy-making role, are in a special class of employees
and might seldom prevail under the First Amendment
in keeping
their jobs when they conflict with their em2 04
ployers.

The four dissenting judges faulted the majority
for ignoring the Romer decision. Arguing that
although the Pickering balancing test is the right
measure for reviewing government employment
actions implicating the First Amendment, the dissenters reasoned that "[w]ith Romer in the balance, the scales tip decidedly in favor of Shahar
because Bowers' asserted interests are not a legitimate basis for infringing Shahar's constitutionallyprotected right of intimate association. '"20 5 The
dissenters found that the Attorney General's justifications were all based on "animosity toward
homosexuals" as a class, which Romer held not to
2 °6
be a rational basis for state action.
Although Shaharcalls into question the out-ofworkplace first amendment rights of lesbian and
gay public employees, its impact on the right of
lesbian and gay public schoolteachers may be limited. The state's justification in Shahar-that the
nature of Shahar's job required her expression
and conduct both on and off the job to be consistent with the Attorney General's political positions-is not analogous to the case of teachers.
Unlike junior attorneys in attorney general offices, public schoolteachers are not in "policymaking roles" that require them to "act as spokespersons for their employers." In addition, it is unlikely that the out-of-school same-sex marriage of
a public schoolteacher would disrupt school activities to the same degree that Bowers claimed such a
marriage ceremony would disrupt the activities of
his office.
e.

ProhibitionsAgainst Same-Sex PDAs Fail
Under First Amendment Scrutiny

Because same-sex PDAs may be protectible ex204
Id. at 1103 (citing Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374, 378
(1lth Cir. 1993)); See Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972
F.2d 1230, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 1992).
205
Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1126 (Birch, Cir.J., dissenting).
206
Id. at 1126-27 (citing Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628).
207
501 U.S. 560 (1991).
208
Id. at 577 n.4 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
209
142 CONG. REC. S9986, S9993 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(Statement of Sen. Hatch).
210
Barnes, 501 U.S. 577 n.4 (Scalia, J. concurring in the
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pression, government attempts to restrict such expression-such as a prohibition on same-sex
PDAs by teachers-likely would invoke the First
Amendment's freedom of expression guarantee.
Like Aaron Fricke's desire to attend the prom
with his same-sex date, a gay or lesbian schoolteacher's out-of-classroom public displays of affection (i.e., hand-holding, kissing, and hugging)
may count as significantly expressive symbolic
speech. In his concurrence to Barnes v. Glen Theatre,2017 in which the Supreme Court found that
public nude dancing qualifies as "expressive conduct," Justice Antonin Scalia defined "inherently
expressive conduct" as conduct "that is normally
engaged in for the purpose of communicating an
2
idea, or perhaps an emotion, to someone else." 01

Clearly, "hold[ing] hands, walk[ing] arm in arm
• . .and engaging in some kissing," 2°19 what was
described during the Senate's ENDA debate as
PDAs, are acts which are "normally engaged in for
.an emothe purpose of communicating.
'2
tion... to someone else. " "

In reviewing a government action that interferes with freedom of expression, it is first necessary to determine the impetus of the action. If
the regulation of the conduct is not directly related to the expressive aspects or the content of
the activity and is therefore "content-neutral," the
O'Brien test is applied. As noted above, the Fricke
court opted to apply this content-neutral analysis,
reasoning that it was not the content of Aaron's
expression, but the threat of violence associated
with allowing Aaron to bring his same-sex date
that was the justification for restricting Aaron's
21
expression. '
If, however, the regulation is directed at restricting the content of the expression itself the
regulation is deemed "content-based," must be
treated as if it restricted the expression itself, and
must be subjected to First Amendment strict scrutiny.2 12 For example, the Supreme Court found

in Texas v. Johnson2 13 that Texas's overarching injudgment).
211
Fricke, 491 F.Supp. at 385.
212
See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 179, at 331; John Hart
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1482, 1497-98 (1975).
213
491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (finding that the act of
burning the American flag is expressive conduct protected by
the First Amendment).
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terest in attempting to outlaw flag-burning was in
suppressing the message associated with the flagburning. 2 14 Under strict First Amendment review
of content-based regulations, the regulation will
be sustained only if it (1) serves a compelling state
objective, and (2) is drawn as narrowly as possible
21 5
to achieve that objective.
Consequently, if a school board were to "take
action against" a teacher for engaging in same-sex
PDAs during non-school hours, such actions likely
would constitute a violation of the teacher's freedom of expression. Such actions clearly would be
content-based, given that the actions are targeted
directly at the expression (i.e. same-sex affection)
and not an objective unrelated to the expression.
That objective, which is based solely on social
prejudice against and discomfort with homosexuality, is illegitimate.
Even if the strict free speech scrutiny applied to
content-based government actions did not apply
to a proscription of same-sex PDAs, it very likely
would be invalidated under O'Brien relaxed scrutiny. Perpetuating homophobia is not an "important or substantial government interest," and thus
a ban on same-sex PDAs would fail the O'Brien
test.
f.

Applying the Schoolteacher Speech Cases

Because our discussion of same-sex PDAs in this
instance involves teachers, a straightforward First
Amendment inquiry is inadequate to determine
whether a limitation on such expressive conduct
would be constitutionally permissible. Whether
the same-sex PDAs take place on or away from
school grounds may determine which line of
schoolteacher speech cases would apply.
214

See id.

See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70
(1981) (holding that a state university violated First Amendment by refusing to allow student religious groups to meet
215

anywhere on campus, although non-religious student groups
were accorded that privilege); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981) (holding a San Diego ordinance prohibiting all billboards containing non-commercial
messages except for certain categories (e.g., political campaign signs, time, and temperature signs) unconstitutional
given that "[t]he city may not choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse").

First Amendment protection,

however, is not accorded to "unprotected" categories of expression, which include defamation, advocacy of imminent
lawless behavior, "fighting words," and obscenity. See

TRIBE,

supra note 89, §§ 12-12 to 12-13, at 861-86 (defamation),
§ 12-19, at 841-49 (lawless action), § 12-10, at 849-56 ("fight-

g.

Same-Sex Out-of-Classroom PDAs are Protectible
Speech Under Pickering Test

The arguments made on the Senate floor
against ENDA concerning same-sex PDAs suggest
that the concern is not so much the same-sex
PDAs of teachers in public settings away from the
school itself but, more importantly, the displays of
same-sex affection in view of schoolchildren, involving a schoolteacher outside of the school
building, for example, when the schoolteacher is
dropped-off at work in the morning or is pickedup after the schoolday is over. These PDAs
should be treated as protected speech under the
Pickeringtest.
As discussed above, school authorities do not
have the power to control the out-of-classroom
speech of public schoolteachers that concerns
controversial matters of public importance and
that does not harm or disrupt the school's ability
to operate efficiently or inhibit the teacher's ability or fitness to carry out his or her teaching duties. Like Aaron Fricke's decision to take a samesex date to his prom, which the court described as
a political statement, a schoolteacher's same-sex
21 6
PDA may have politically expressive value.
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a gay or lesbian schoolteacher's out-of-school same-sex PDAs
would in any way harm or disrupt the school's operations or hamper the teacher's teaching abilities. Like the teacher in Acanfora, whose acknowledgment of his homosexuality to the press was
deemed insufficient grounds for termination,
teachers who engage in same-sex PDAs similarly
are not disrupting school operations or impeding
their effectiveness as teachers by engaging in such
PDAs. 217 Even if out-of-school same-sex PDAs did
ing words"), and § 12-16, at 904-19 (obscenity).
216
See Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 385. Even if same-sex PDAs
were deemed not to express a political message or were nonpublic, however, such PDAs should still be entitled to First
Amendment protection. See EDITORS OF HAR\,'AP LAw REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 77 n.23, 77 (1990)
(noting that the First Amendment protects political as well as
non-political speech. "In the context of sexual orientation,
social activity can both contribute to political debate and provide independent value and self-fulfillment to the speaker.")
and (analogizing to civil rights era, where "the political movement for equal rights frequently took the form of demands
for equal treatment of individual citizens in social settings.").
217
See National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affd 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per

curiam) (invalidating as unconstitutional state law permitting
punishment for "public homosexual conduct," which in-
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have some negative effects on school operations
or teaching effectiveness, such effects most likely
would have been caused by societal prejudice
against lesbians and gay men, an impetus for discrimination deemed illegitimate by Romer.
2. In-Classroom PDAs
There is little question that most PDAs between
teachers and their significant others in the school
building and in public view may not be appropriate, regardless of sexual orientation. As explained
in the following section, what is most important
with respect to restrictions on in-school PDAs is
that they be equally applied to both straight and
gay teachers. Placing restrictions on displays of
same-sex affection, while permitting heterosexual
PDAs, very likely would be unconstitutional.
Moreover, as is the case with "proselytization," it is
highly unlikely that lesbian and gay schoolteachers would risk theirjobs or their educational effectiveness in order to engage in same-sex PDAs during school hours, inside the school building. It is
conceivable that like most heterosexual teachers,
lesbian and gay teachers prefer to keep their family life private in the course of carrying out their
teaching duties so as to not detract from their educational mission. As the district court decision
in Acanfora recognized, "to some extent every
teacher has to go out of his way to hide his private
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would violate the First Amendment, but also
would be a clear violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee. Moreover, because such a discriminatory classification
is based on a fundamental right, i.e. symbolic expression (same-sex PDAs), the classification is subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of whether the
class discriminated against is a designated "suspect class."2 19 Typically, a government classification is required only to bear a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose, but that
where the classification "encompasses a suspect
class or burdens a fundamental right ... the government [is] held to a stricter standard ofjustifi22
cation." o1

"Taking action" against teachers for out-of-classroom same-sex PDAs, when no disciplinary action
is taken against heterosexual PDAs, not only

Under strict first amendment scrutiny, the classification in question is upheld only if it is "necessary" to promote a "compelling" government
interest. 22' There is no valid, nevermind compelling, government interest in singling out gay and
lesbian teachers for discrimination solely to advance obsolete and vague notions of morality and
what constitutes a "good role model."
Moreover, given society's gradually increasing
understanding and acceptance of gay people, it is
highly unlikely that the out-of-classroom same-sex
PDAs feared by certain Senators (i.e., hugging,
holding hands, etc.) would cause even the slightest disruption in school order or in the teacher's
effectiveness in the classroom. As the Supreme
Court made clear in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,222 mere "discomfort
and unpleasantness" are insufficient disruptions
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.2 23 An attempt to accommodate or cater to
the prejudices and discomfort of heterosexuals toward gay people, by definition, cannot be a legitimate state interest.2 24 And as the Court said in

cluded "advocacy.").
218
Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 856.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
219
U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15
(1982).
FYicke, 491 F. Supp. at 381, 388 n.6 (citing Police
220
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972), where the Supreme
Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting picketing because it singled out labor picketing only and thus violated the
principle of neutral treatment of similarly situated speakers
("Because picketing plainly involves expressive conduct
within the protection of the First Amendment, discriminations among pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial
governmental interest."); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations omitted) (invalidating ordinance banning cross burning because the ordinance did not

treat all symbolic "fighting words" equally, but selectively prohibited those based on race, color, creed, religion or gender:
"[t] he First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech or even expressive conduct because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed.").
221
See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95; see also TRIBE, supra note 89,
§ 16-9, at 1459.
222
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
223
Id. at 509.
224
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."); see also
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 ("[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a
zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a
home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment

life .....

218

a. ProhibitionsAgainst Same-Sex PDAs Also Fail
Under Equal Protection Scrutiny
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United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,22 5
"if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare .

.

. desire to harm a

politically unpopular group cannot constitute a le226
gitimate governmental interest."
In sum, although the Supreme Court has not
yet deemed sexual orientation a suspect classification meriting heightened scrutiny, promising language in such recent cases as Romer and Nabozny
confirm that unreasonable distinctions between
gay and straight teachers are constitutionally impermissible. As a simple matter of fairness and
equity, gay and lesbian teachers should not be disciplined for actions for which heterosexual teachers are not disciplined. The double standard advocated by the Senators opposing ENDA very
clearly would do just that, without promoting any
valid government interest.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although virtually none of the arguments
raised against ENDA during the 1996 Senate floor
debates were new, these arguments were strikingly
outmoded and in direct conflict with scientific evidence concerning the nature of sexual orientation and with well-settled First and Fourteenth
Amendment principles and caselaw. Given the increasing scientific understanding that homosexuality generally is fixed and unchangeable, the
claim that lesbian and gay schoolteachers are de
facto poor role models who are apt to recruit their
students to homosexuality lacks any valid basis.
Sexual orientation has no impact on a person's
ability to be a successful schoolteacher admired by
students and adults alike.
Moreover, the presence of lesbian or gay teachers in the schools not only benefits all children by
enhancing the overall diversity of school faculty, it
benefits lesbian and gay youth in particular.
Given the increased propensity of these youths to
commit suicide as a result of feeling isolated and
ostracized, the existence of lesbian or gay teachers
houses, multiple dwellings, and the like ....

[T]he city may

not avoid the strictures of [the Equal Protection] Clause by
deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the
body politic.").

on the school faculty may make the difference between life or death for many gay and*lesbian children.
In addition, the fact that the Supreme Court in
its Romer decision found that animosity toward gay
people is not a legitimate basis for state action
also makes it highly unlikely that a school board
could refuse to hire lesbian or gay schoolteachers
for no other reason than the notion that lesbians
and gay men are intrinsically immoral and thus,
poor role models for their students. To borrow
from Justice Kennedy, this a school administrator
cannot do.
Similarly, the notion that ENDA somehow
would permit lesbian or gay schoolteachers to
proselytize in the classroom is baseless. ENDA's
only effect will be to ensure that lesbian and gay
employees and candidates are judged by their
work performance and not on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Consequently, ENDA will not
affect longstanding and well-settled precedent according school boards and school administrators
expansive jurisdiction over the in-classroom
speech of public schoolteachers.
Also, the claim that ENDA would prohibit a
school board from disciplining a gay teacher for
public displays of affection with a same-sex partner during non-school hours is misplaced. It is
the First Amendment's free speech guarantee,
and not ENDA, that would protect such PDAs,
which very likely may be deemed political or symbolic speech.
Finally, perhaps the most persuasive evidence
exposing the invalidity of the alarmist claims
raised against ENDA involving schoolteachers is
the fact that these claims have not materialized in
the states and local jurisdictions with ENDA-like
laws securely in plade. The protection of lesbian
and gay public schoolteachers from discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sexual orientation in many state and local jurisdictions has not
engendered the negative consequences predicted
by Senators Aschroft and Nickles, among others,
in opposing ENDA on a federal level.
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413 U.S. 528 (1973).

Id. at 534, cited in Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628; see also
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982).
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